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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SARAH L. GREEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

No. 48110-2020
Kootenai County Case No.
CR28-19-12369

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Green failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing her to a
concurrent unified term of five years with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction, for each of
two counts of criminal possession of a financial transaction card?
ARGUMENT
Green Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
According to the Presentence Report (“PSI”), the police reports summarized events leading

to Green’s convictions for criminal possession of a financial transaction card as follows:
Sara J. Parker advised Kootenai County Sheriff’s deputies that credit cards were
fraudulently opened in her name. According to Chase Bank the loss on the two
credit cards totaled $10,540.82. During an investigation, Sarah Green was found
to have used the credit cards at various local and online businesses between July
1

12, 2018 and August 24, 2018. A warrant was issued for Sarah Green for Burglary,
Grand Theft, Criminal Possession of a Financial Transaction Card, and
Misappropriation of Personal Identifying Information. On September 27, 2018,
Ms. Green was arrested, and deputies located the two credit cards in her possession.
A search warrant was served at Ms. Green’s residence and deputies located multiple
items of evidence to include: mail, packaging slips, packages (empty) in Sarah
Parker’s name, receipt and invoice from Hillyard Tire in Steve’s name, (located in
Steve’s wallet and found by Detective D. Hollenbeck), Walmart Gift card. . . . Ms.
Green was interviewed and admitted to making every purchase on both cards in
question, but claimed the cards were obtained in her name and using her own
personal information.
(PSI, p.7.)
A grand jury indicted Green on four counts of criminal possession of a financial transaction
card. (R., pp.12-14). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Green pled guilty to two counts and, on the
state’s motion, two counts were dismissed. (R., pp.156, 158-161.) The district court imposed
concurrent sentences of five years with two years fixed, and placed Green in the retained
jurisdiction (“rider”) program. (R., pp.174-178.) Green filed a Rule 35 motion to reduce her
sentences, which was denied. (R., pp.205-207, 224-225.) Green filed a timely notice of appeal
from her judgment and sentence. (R., pp.179-182, 228-231.) On appeal Green argues that the
district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. Green specifically contends
the district court did not adequately consider that she is a devoted mother to her four children, she
has no prior felony convictions, and she accepted responsibility for her offenses. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.5-7.)

Green further asserts that the district court should have “followed [her]

recommendations by imposing concurrent unified sentence[s] of four years, with two years fixed,
suspending the sentences, and placing her on supervised probation for a period of two years.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.)
Application of the relevant standards shows Green has failed to show an abuse of
discretion.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s
probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it
is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). A sentence is reasonable if it appears
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. State v. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 447,
454, 447 P.3d 895, 902 (2019); Anderson, 163 Idaho at 517, 415 P.3d at 385 (citing State v.
Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982)).
In evaluating whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a
four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason.” State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citing
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C.

Green Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). The record shows no abuse of discretion.
3

The district court considered and applied the four sentencing criteria of deterrence,
retribution, rehabilitation, and the main goal of protection of society. (Tr., p.27, L.24 – p.28, L.6.)
The court also reviewed all of the materials submitted, listened to “what everybody has to say[,]”
and listened to the lawyers’ recommendations. (Tr., p.28, Ls.7-10.) The court said its sentencing
decision was based only on the crimes Green was being sentenced for, and explained its decision
to place her in the rider program as follows:
You’re years old. You have some misdemeanors on your record,[1] but you don’t
have any prior felony convictions. You have gotten involved yourself with the theft
of a lot of money. I mean, this is thousands and thousands of dollars. And that
deserves some sort of accountability or retribution, and hopefully will have a
deterrent effect as well.
Now, I will tell you, I am not considering as part of this sentence any of the
pending cases or the allegations that haven’t gone to court yet that haven’t been
proven.[2] The presentence report had a lot of that in there and I don’t find that that
would be appropriate to consider because you haven’t had your day in court on
those allegations, and so I’m not going to even consider those as part of the
appropriate sentence is [sic] concerned sentence.
You made a very interesting statement a few moments ago, and it was that
you’ve always been broke. And I read over, you know, the long statement that you
wrote and that has – that has been a constant theme, a struggle. So when this credit
card became available and you participated in it and activated the credit card, and
then participated in the benefits of the purchases, that is too good to be true. That
1

The Presentence Report stated:
[Green’s] adult criminal history consists of thirteen misdemeanor convictions
including fish and game violations, Driving Without a License, and Domestic
Battery. In addition, she was convicted of felony Possession of Controlled
Substance-Hydrocodone. She completed a diversion program and the charge was
later dismissed. Ms. Green has been incarcerated in Idaho and Washington and has
never been placed on supervised probation.

(PSI, p.26.)
2
Green’s argument that she is not responsible for “multiple episodes where someone attempted
to open a line of credit, apply for a credit card, or take a loan in [the victim’s] name” (Appellant’s
brief, p.7) that reportedly occurred between Green’s arrest and sentencing is irrelevant – the district
court gave that information no consideration.
4

is something where you have a choice and you made the wrong choice to participate
in that activity. And that’s what I’m focusing on here.
....
On one hand, if I just lock somebody up, I know they’re not going to be
committing any type of offenses, but you’re not going to be locked up forever. On
the other hand, if I put you out on probation, I have to have some confidence that
you are going to succeed on probation and I don’t have that confidence right now.
....
So here’s what I’m going to do in your case. I’m going to impose a sentence
and retain jurisdiction. Let me explain to you what the retained jurisdiction
program is. The retained jurisdiction program gives you an opportunity to focus on
yourself and look at the decisions that you have made that got you into this trouble,
that got you into this point in your life. You get to work on yourself without all the
distractions of real life and if you take advantage of this program –
....
You will – you will earn the right to a recommendation for probation. But
if you don’t, if you don’t take advantage of it, if you don’t fully participate in the
program, if you don’t follow all the rules, then you’re likely to serve the sentence,
and so I know this is not what you want to hear. I can see that all over your face,
but I want you to understand that this is a very good opportunity for you to change
your life around and not let yourself get into any [inaudible] of legal trouble in the
future.
(Tr., p.29, L.10 – p.31, L.20 (emphases added).)
The district court based the protection/punitive/deterrence side of its sentencing
determination on Green’s decision to take advantage of a situation “too good to be true” by
activating another person’s credit card and making “thousands and thousands of dollars” of
purchases with it. (Tr., p.29, Ls.13-14, p.30, Ls.5-8.) In regard to rehabilitation, although the
court was not convinced that Green would succeed on probation, it was willing to give her a chance
to prove otherwise through the rider program. The court’s measured analysis fell well within the
scope of reasonable discretion.

5

Green argues that her sentences are excessive in two ways – (1) she should have been
placed on two years’ probation instead of a rider, and (2) the indeterminate term should have been
two years instead of three. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5, 8.) Green’s first complaint is now moot due
to the fact that, according to the Idaho Department of Correction and iCourt websites, she was
released to adult felony probation on April 5, 2021 (iCourt) or April 6, 2021 (IDOC). The remedy
of probation “would not result in any relief” because it would not “have a practical effect on the
outcome.” Boe v. Boe, 163 Idaho 922, 927, 422 P.3d 1128, 1133 (2018) (quoting Houpt v. Wells
Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 160 Idaho 181, 189, 370 P.3d 384, 392 (2016) (quoting Fenn v. Noah,
142 Idaho 775, 779, 133 P.3d 1240, 1244 (2006)).
Because Green recommended a two-year fixed term, any error by the district court in
following that recommendation is invited error. “The invited error doctrine is well settled in Idaho.
A defendant may not request a particular ruling by the trial court and later argue on appeal that the
ruling was erroneous. This doctrine applies to sentencing decisions as well as to rulings during
trial.” State v. Griffith, 110 Idaho 613, 614, 716 P.2d 1385, 1386 (Ct. App. 1986). “In short,
invited errors are not reversible.” State v. Edghill, 155 Idaho 846, 849, 317 P.3d 743, 746 (Ct.
App. 2014). Therefore, the only viable argument remaining for Green is that the district court
abused its discretion by ordering an indeterminate term of three years instead of two.
Green argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences
in light of her being close to her children, she has no prior felony convictions, and she accepted
responsibility for her crimes. 3 (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-8.) Green’s closeness to her children is

3

The LSI-R (“Level of Service Inventory –Revised”) placed Green in the moderate risk category
for re-offense. (PSI, p.26.) Green’s I.C. § 19-2524 Mental Health Examination concluded that
she “did not present with serious mental illness or other mental health needs[,]” and her GAIN-I
CORE assessment “indicated no substance dependency or use[,]” and no treatment was
recommended. (PSI, p.27.)
6

certainly a positive dynamic in her life. However, with 13 misdemeanor convictions, Green is no
stranger to criminality. (See n.1, supra.) Further, although she apologized to the victim during the
sentencing hearing, Green attempted to place some blame for her actions on Steve Parker, whom
she considered her common law husband. (Tr., p.27, Ls.3-21; PSI, p.11.) The pre-sentence
investigator summarized some of Green’s comments:
Unbeknownst to her, Steve applied for credit cards under the name Sarah Parker
and a different social security number and birth date than hers. When the cards
showed up, he told her the card had a $5,000 limit, but the paperwork showed the
limit to be $10,000. She indicated she had to call Chase bank to activate the cards.
She stated she did not realize the card was not legitimately hers because they never
asked her birth date or social security number.
(PSI, p.10.) Green’s claim of ignorance shows she did not fully accept responsibility for her
crimes. The Presentence Report concluded that Green was not amenable to supervision because
she took no responsibility for her crime, showed no remorse, continued to victimize the same
individual, and “appeared to have been dishonest throughout the presentence process[.]” (PSI,
p.27.) Green has failed to show that her sentences are excessive in any way, especially by ordering
an indeterminate term of three years instead of two.
The district court applied the correct legal standards and exercised its discretion to impose
a reasonable sentence. Green has failed to show error.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 19th day of May, 2021.

/s/ John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of May, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
BEN P. McGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

JCM/dd

/s/ John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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